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CONFLICT-OF-LAWS RULES BY TREATY: 
RECOGNITION OF COMPANIES IN A 
REGIONAL MARKET 
Eric Stein* 
T HE term "recognition" has many meanings. We speak in family law of a "recognized child," in public international law of rec-
ognizing a newly emerged state or newly installed government, and 
in private international law (conflict of laws) of recognizing foreign 
judgments or legal persons. In both public and private international 
law, it is the nation-state that grants or denies recognition. In public 
international law, the "recognizing" nation-state expresses "a value 
judgment acknowledging that a given fact situation is in accord 
with the exigencies of the international legal order."1 In private 
international law (or conflict of laws), on the other hand, the "rec-
ognizing" nation-state agrees to extend to its own system certain 
legal effects attributed to a fact situation in the legal system of an-
other nation-state. 
In a pluralistic, horizontally organized world community of na-
tion-states, "recognition" has been a traditional instrumentality for 
cohesion, even though nation-states have exercised wide discretion 
in appraising various fact situations and, particularly in public in-
ternational law, have often employed recognition in pursuit of na-
tional foreign policy without reference to the demands of the legal 
order. However, within a more closely integrated federal or regional 
community of states, public international law is displaced-to a 
greater or lesser extent, depending upon the degree of community 
integration-by "internal" law; and the discretion of one member 
state in granting or denying recognition of judgments or legal per-
sons, including companies, of another member state is curtailed by 
normative constraints designed to protect common interests of the 
community. 
• Professor of Law and co-director of International and Comparative Legal Studies, 
University of Michigan. J.U.D. 1937, Charles University, Prague; J.D. 1942, University of 
Michigan. This Article is based on materials contained in a book entitled HARMONIZA-
TION OF "EUROPEAN" COMPANY LAws, THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANS-
NATIONAL COORDINATION, scheduled for publication by the 13obbs-Menill Company, 
Inc. The author wishes to acknowledge gratefully the valuable assistance he received 
from Dr. Georg Sandberger of the University of Tiibingen Faculty of Law. 
1. Rigaux, Les personnes morales en droit international privt!, 24 ANNAi.ES DE DROrr 
'Er DE SCIENCES POLITIQUES, 241, 245 (1964), 
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I. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
AS A REGIONAL COMMUNITY 
[Vol. 68:1327 
The European Economic Community (EEC or Community) is 
today the most "integrated" regional community of nation-states. 
It is based on a multilateral treaty-the Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community2-which embodies an intricate de-
sign for a progressive coalescence of the national economies of the 
six "sovereign" member states (Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) into 
a single "Common Market" and eventually into an economic union. 
The Common Market embraces the "four freedoms": freedom of 
movement of goods, freedom of movement for workers, freedom of 
movement for individuals and companies to enter business and to 
supply services across national frontiers, and freedom of movement 
for capital throughout the territory of the Community.3 Moreover, 
a system of Community-wide rules is necessary in order to ensure a 
legal order for fair, qualified competition. A common Community-
wide policy must govern agriculture, transportation, and commer-
cial relations with nonmember nations. National economic and 
monetary policies are to be "coordinated" so as to advance growth 
with stability; and social policies are to be "harmonized." To make 
this system function smoothly the Treaty provides for a set of new 
Community institutions, the most important of which are the inde-
pendent "executive" Commission4 and the Council of Ministers,is 
which share the lawmaking power, and the Court of Justice.6 
II. Is THERE A NEED FOR UNIFORM CONFLICT-OF-LAWS 
RULES ON RECOGNITION OF COMPANIES THROUGHOUT 
THE COMMUNITY? 
Commercial companies are the dominant mode for the conduct 
of business in the modern world. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
Community scheme is particularly concerned with such companies 
and contemplates that segments of the presently divergent national 
2. Done at Rome March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. See 
also Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951, 261 
U.N.T.S. 140; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, April 27, 
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. 
3. EEC Treaty arts. 9 to 37 (goods); arts. 48 to 51 (workers); arts. 52 to 66 (estab-
lishment and supply of services); arts. 67 to 73 (capital). 
4. EEC Treaty arts. 155 to 163. 
5. EEC Treaty arts. 145 to 154. 
6. EEC Treaty arts. 164 to 188. 
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company laws be "coordinated" so as to be more similar to one 
another in terms of the protection afforded to shareholders, inves-
tors, and creditors.7 
The authors of the EEC Treaty recognized that if companies 
are to help integrate national markets into a common market-
much as American corporations have helped to create a single 
continental market in the United States-the legal order must en-
able such companies to progress from the classic import-export 
pattern to a stage at which they create relatively permanent "estab-
lishments" beyond their mm states' borders.8 In American consti-
tutional parlance, the company which has been engaged only in 
"interstate" business must be free to "enter" another state with a 
view to doing "intrastate" business there. In order to be able to 
effect this entry, however, the company must be "recognized" as a 
legal person in the receiving state; otherwise it will not be able 
legally to carry on business there, to make contracts, or to sue and 
be sued in local courts. An analogous situation prevails in the 
EEC. If a company organized in one member state wishes to do 
business in another member state, it must be "recognized" in the 
receiving state as a legal person.9 The freedom to establish a business 
(freedom of establishment)10 and the freedom to supply services 
across national frontiers11-freedoms which the EEC Treaty sought 
to ensure throughout the Community for the benefit of the com-
panies of member states-could not be effectively achieved without 
the concomitant assurance of "recognition" of such companies. Al-
though the obligation to recognize in this context appears to be 
implicit in the Treaty, the member states undertook explicitly in 
article 22012 to negotiate about securing "mutual recognition of 
companies ·within the meaning of article 58."13 
7. See generally, Scholten, Company Law in Europe, 4 COMMON MARKET I.Aw RE-
VIEW [C.M. L. REv.J 377 (1967); Stein, Assimilation of National Laws as a Function of 
European Integration, 58 AM. J. INTL. L. I, 16-17 (1964). 
8. U. EVERLING, THE RIGHT OF EsTABLISHMENT IN THE COMMON MARKET 1J 105 (1964). 
9. See Beitzke, Anerkennung und Sitzverlegung von Gesellschaften und juristischen 
Personen im EWG Bereich, 127 ZEITSCHRIFI' FUR DAS GESAMTE HANDELSRECHT UND WIRT-
SCHAFTSRI:CHT [Z. GES. HANDELSR. u. WIRTSCHR.J I, 2 (1964) [hereinafter Beitzke, Aner-
kennung]; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung der Rechtsfiihigkeit juristischer Personen, 31 
RABELS ZEITSCHRIFI' [RABELS Z.] 1 at 16-17 (1967), [hereinafter Grossfeld, Die Aner-
kennung]. 
IO. EEC Treaty arts. 52 to 58. 
II. EEC Treaty arts. 59 to 66. 
12. EEC Treaty art. 220: "Member States shall, insofar as necessary, engage in nego-
tiations with each other with a view to ensuring for the benefit of their nationals: 
••• -the mutual recognition of companies within the meaning of Article 58, second 
paragraph. • •• " 
13. For the text of article 58, see note 36 infra. 
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In the absence of uniform conflict-oUaws rules, the question 
whether a foreign company will be recognized or denied recognition 
is determined in each member state by its own conflict-of-laws rules 
which serve to identify the applicable law. These conflict-of-laws 
rules vary considerably from state to state. In the Netherlands the 
applicable law is the law of the state of the company's incorpora-
tion, 14 while in the other five member states the law of the state of 
the company's "real seat" (central administration) applies.15 The 
"real seat" rule is reflected in national legislation, case law, and in 
some treaties; but there are important variations in its application 
among those states which adhere to it.16 It is said that so long 
14. Law of July 25, 1959, [1959] Staatsblad No. 256. See van der Heijen &: van 
der Grinten, HANDBOEK VOOR DE NAAMLOOZE VENNOOTSCHAP NAAR NEDERLANDSRECHT 
76, 83-85 (8th ed. 1968); E. RABEL, 2 THE CoNFLicr OF LA.ws: A CoMl'ARATIVE STUDY 34' 
(2d ed. 1960). 
15. See note 16 infra. 
16. France: Art. 3 of the Law of July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966] D.S.L. 265, 
on commercial companies provides: "Companies whose [real] seat (siege social) is 
situated on French territory are subject to French law. Third persons may rely on 
the registered seat but the company may not invoke it as against third parties if its 
[real] seat is situated in another place" (i.e., in a place other than the registered seat). 
See comment in F. LEMEuNIER, 1 LA REFORME DES SoCIETES CoMMERCIALES 14 (1966). 
However, article 154 of the same law (which follows the earlier rule contained in the 
Ordinance of January 7, 1959, [1959] J.O. 640, [1960] BL.D. 447) sanctions a transfer 
of the seat to another country, upon approval in an extraordinary shareholders' meet-
ing, without the loss of legal personality of the company, but only if the receiving 
country has concluded with France a "special convention" permitting the acquisition 
of its "nationality" and preserving the legal personality upon transfer to its territory. 
See Convention Concerning Conditions of Residence Between France and Belgium, 
Oct. 6, 1927, [1927] D.P. IV. 396 (France), 66 L.N.T.S. 49. See also H. BATIFFOL, TRAITE 
ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE No. 193-98 (3d ed. 1959). 
Federal Republic of Germany: In one German case, a company incorporated in a 
state of the United States for the exploitation of Mexican mines, with its main office 
in Hamburg, fraudulently sold shares in Germany to German residents. In a suit by 
defrauded shareholders, the German courts refused to consider the company an Amer-
ican corporation and thus refused to apply the law of the state of its incorporation. 
Since the company failed to comply with the requirements of German stock-company 
law, it was not considered a German stock company; and the courts consequently 
applied the German law on noncorporate associations. Judgment of March 31, 1904, 
9 DJZ 555 (Deutsche Juristenzeitung), 33 JW 231 Guristische Wochenschrift). See also 
Judgment of Jan. 19, 1918, RGZ 73, 76; Judgment of Jan. 19, 1882, 7 RGZ 68. On 
the other hand, in the situation in which the company does not have its real seat in 
Germany and the state of the company's real seat follows the incorporation principle 
(for example, a Delaware corporation with its real seat in Kentucky), German courts 
will apply the law of incorporation with respect to that company, and not the law 
of the real seat. See the case of Eskimo Pie Corp., 117 RGZ 215, 217 (1927). Some 
writers advocate the "law of incorporation" rule: see, e.g., Beitzke, Anerkennung 13 
and references in that Article. 
Belgium: Article 197 of the Code de commerce, ConE COMM. art. 197 (Pasinomie 
1935), provides that all companies whose "principal establishment" is in Belgium are 
subject to Belgian law; and article 196 states that companies organized and having 
their seat (siege) abroad may conduct their operations and appear in courts in Bel• 
gium. In 1965 the Cour de cassation in Lamot v. Societe Lamot Ltd., 65 R.EvuE PRA.TIQUE 
DES soCIETES 136 (1966), held that these provisions allow an English company to transfer 
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as recognition is governed by divergent national rules, freedom of 
establishment within the Community cannot be properly safe-
guarded.17 In addition the need for recognition may arise and must 
be ensured outside the context of establishment and supply of ser-
vices. Thus a company, organized and operating in a member state, 
can be denied standing to sue in another member state on a con-
tract for sale of goods, unrelated to any supply of services, unless 
the company is recognized in that other state as a legal person with 
a capacity to sue. For these reasons, uniform conflict-of-laws rules 
respecting recognition of companies by member states may be de-
sirable for the realization of a Common Market.18 
its "real seat" to Belgium without a loss of legal personality. but that they subject the 
company to the mandatory rules of Beligian company law. 
Luxembourg: Article 159 of the Law of Aug. IO. 1915, on commercial companies 
follows the Belgian article 197; and article 158 of that law follows the Belgian article 
196. 
Italy: Article 2505 of the Codice civile. C. Cxv. art. 2505 (Hoepli 1964). states: 
"Companies organized abroad which have on the territory of the [Italian] State the 
seat of their administration or the principal object of the enterprise (sede dell' 
amministrazione ovvero I'oggetto principale dell' impresa) are subject to all provisions 
of the Italian law, including those on the validity of their constitutive act." See also 
C. Cxv. arts. 2437, 2506·10 (Hoepli 1964). 
On these problems generally, see Conard, Organizing for Business, in 2 .A:MmuCAN 
ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET-A LEGAL PROFILE I, 61-65 (E. Stein 
Be T. Nicholson ed. 1960); J. R.ENAULD, DRorr EUROPEEN DES soCJtrfs 2.28-2.35, 2.65-2.66, 
6.04-6.07 (1969). 
With respect to the United States, see A. EHRENZWEIG, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLIC'l' 
OF LAws 408-23 (1962); and R. LEFLAR, .A:MmuCAN CONFLicrs OF LAw 55-68 (1968). With 
respect to the United Kingdom, see A. DICEY & J. MoRRIS, ON THE CONFLIC'l' OF LAws 
481-97 (8th ed. 1967). 
17. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung von Handelsgesellschaften im EWG-Bereich, 14 
AU$ENWIRTSCHAFI'SDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 91, 99 (1968) [hereinafter Beitzke, Zur 
Anerkennung]; Dieu, La reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tes et personnes morales dans 
les Communautes europt!ennes. 1968 CAHIERS DE DRorr EUROPEEN 532, 534; Goldman, La 
reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tt!s dans la Communaute t!conomique europeenne, in 
t.TUDES JURIDIQUES OFFERTES A LtoN JULLIOT DE LA MoRANDIERE PAR SES tl.tvES EI' SES AMIS 
175, 176-85 (1964) [hereinafter Goldman, La reconnaissance], in which the differences in 
the national statutes, case law, and treaties are described in detail. These differences, 
and the additional reasons why a new convention was considered necessary, are as fol-
lows: (1) The Netherlands applies the "incorporation theory," while the other five 
signatory states follow the "real-seat" theory; (2) the real-seat theory could result in 
a refusal of recognition when the real seat of the foreign company is in the state in 
which recognition is sought-as it does in the Federal Republic of Germany-or it 
could lead to the application of purely local (forum) law to such a company-as it 
does, for example, under article 197 of the Belgian Code de commerce, as interpreted 
by the Cour de cassation (see note 16 supra); (3) the duty of recognition under existing 
bilateral agreements and under the Hagne Convention Concerning Recognition of the 
Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associations, and Foundations, 1 AM. J. 
COMP, L. 277 (1952) (English text) [hereinafter Hagne Convention], does not encompass 
all companies and legal persons covered by EEC article 58; and (4) the traditional 
public-policy exception is much too broad for Community purposes (see text accom• 
panying notes 85-98 infra). 
18. Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91. 
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When national company laws become more similar as a result 
of the "coordination" and "spontaneous assimilation" discernible 
in the current national-law reforms within the member states,19 the 
need for uniform conflict-of-laws rules on recognition of companies 
will undoubtedly be reduced. But the need for such uniform rules 
will by no means be eliminated, since company laws will surely 
continue to differ in many respects. Moreover, these company laws 
will still be a part of the respective national statutory systems and 
will thus remain subject to change by the national lawmaker. 
Consequently, it is unlikely in the foreseeable future, if ever, that 
company law, unlike, for instance, restrictive-practices law,20 will 
become "federal-type" Community law. It will, therefore, continue 
to be necessary to look to the appropriate national conflict-of-laws 
rules in order to determine whether a foreign company will be rec-
ognized as a legal person and, if it is so recognized, what law should 
govern its internal and external relationships.21 Although the prob-
lem has traditionally been posed in terms of these two distinct and 
separate questions, some believe that there is little sense in such 
separation.22 Indeed from a practical viewpoint, "any legal person 
is such only in relation to a specific legal issue, such as his capacity 
to sue, to be sued, or to hold property," and it is in a sense artificial 
to speak of a recognition of a legal person in the abstract.23 
III. BASES FOR RECOGNITION: THE "REAL SEAT" RULE 
OR THE "LAw OF INCORPORATION" RuLE 
A. The Competing Interests 
The modern functional rationale for the Anglo-American-and 
Dutch-rule of incorporation is the need for certainty and maxi-
19. See E. STEIN, HARMONIZATION OF "EUROPEAN" COMPANY LAws-THE PROCESS OF 
NATIONAL REFORM AND TRANSNATIONAL COORDINATION ch. IV (to be published in 1970). 
20. Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty list several restrictive practices which arc 
"incompatible with the Common Market." 
21. 13eitzke, Anerkennung IO; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 3. 
22. Drobnig, Kritische Bemerkungen zum Vorentwurf eines EWG-Obereinkommens 
ilber die Anerkennung von Gesellschaften, 129 Z. GES, HANDELSR. u. WIRTSCHSR. 93, 
113-14 (1966), takes the view that recognition is a real issue only if it is linked with a 
conflict-of-laws rule determining which law governs the internal and external 
relationships of the foreign company. 
A third and separate question, in addition to the two stated in the text, relates to 
the prerequisites for the "establishment" of the foreign company, or-in American 
terms-for its "qualification" to "do business" locally. In the absence of treaty obliga-
tions, these prerequisites are determined by the national law of the state of establish-
ment. See Walker, Foreign Corporation Laws: The Loss of Reason, 47 N.C. L. R.Ev. 1 
(1968). 
23. A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 408. 
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mum uniformity in the choice of law. There can be no doubt about 
the situs of incorporation of a company, no matter where the actual 
corporate administration and operations may be. The "real seat" 
rule, on the other hand, favors the law of the central administration 
or principal place of business for choice-of-law purposes. The ra-
tionale is that only that approach secures proper regard for eco-
nomic reality and prevents fraud on, or "abuse of, the law."24 This 
rule, which is followed to a varying degree in all member states 
except the Nether lands, has been criticized on the ground that the 
task of determining the location of the company's real seat is often 
difficult and "might impose a heavy burden upon the litigants and 
the courts in close cases."25 
In terms of the private and governmental interests involved, the 
problem may be posed in the form of a series of questions: When 
private parties organize a company, should they enjoy the freedom 
or "autonomy" to choose the governing law for the company, just 
as they enjoy similar freedom-particularly on the Continent, and 
to a somewhat more limited extent in the United States-in select-
ing the governing law for a contract?26 Or is it necessary, in view of 
certain interests of a higher order,27 for the company to be governed 
by the law of the state of its "real seat" from which it is adminis-
tered? At times, the question is posed in a less detached formulation, 
with a pointed reference to the Delaware and New Jersey experience: 
Should a state, whether one of the United States or a member state 
of the EEC, be permitted to adopt, in pursuit of its own economic 
interests, an "exorbitantly" liberal company law with the purpose 
of attracting an inordinate number of companies which in fact would 
have little more than a formal connection with its territory? And 
should that state be entitled to expect other states-in the context 
of economic intercourse-to "recognize" such companies as properly 
constituted legal persons?28 
A recent German study of policy considerations underlying these 
two competing principles stresses the difference, in terms of the 
24. Id. at 411; H. BATIFFOL, supra note 16, at No. 194. 
25. Reese &: Kaufmann, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs; Choice of Law and 
the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 CouJM. L. REv. 1118, 1127 (1958). 
26. G. KEGEL, INTERNATIONALF:S PRIVATRECHT 205-12 (2d ed. 1964); with respect to 
the autonomy of the parties generally, see Yntema, "Autonomy" in Choice of Law, 
l .A1.r. J. CoMP. L. 341 (1952). 
27. See text following note 30 infra. 
28. With respect to the movement in the United States opposing an excessively 
broad application of the incorporation theory (the problem of the "tramp" or 
"pseudo-foreign corporation"), see Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate 
Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 194-96 (1958); and 
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 138-43 (1955). 
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socioeconomic impact, between applying conflict-of-laws rules to 
simple contracts and applying them to commercial companies which 
today constitute the most common organizational form of signifi-
cant enterprise in any national economy.29 Whereas the contract 
law contemplates the widest autonomy of the parties, the company 
law in most Continental states contains a great number of manda-
tory rules which reflect national legal and economic policies.80 As 
a result, the state naturally seeks to have its law applied to all those 
enterprises which center their activities on its territory; it wants to 
make sure that these enterprises do not "escape" its control by 
claiming to be governed by the law of another state with perhaps 
a more liberal or, in any case, a different system. A variety of gov-
ernmental interests, real or imaginary, may be involved, including 
the protection of local creditors and investors and protection of 
the competitive position of local companies. The assumption is, of 
course, that significant systemic differences exist between the legal 
orders concerned, and that as these differences give way to a measure 
of consensus on questions of economic, social, and legal policy, the 
intensity of the governmental interest of the national lawmaker in 
the application of its own law will decrease. Then, the freedom of 
parties to choose their o·wn law may readily be given a broader 
scope, as is contemplated by the incorporation rule. 
In practical terms, the problem in the EEC today is posed by 
the fact that the Dutch law resembles more the "liberal" or per-
missive "enabling type" act, such as is found in Delaware, than it 
does the laws of the other five member states, which are substan-
tially more regulatory and restrictive.31 The fear persists in some 
quarters within the Community that because of the greater freedom 
afforded by the Dutch law, entrepreneurs will be lured to incorpo-
rate in the Netherlands to the prejudice of the other member states 
with stricter company laws. 
The principle of incorporation has been meeting with increasing 
favor from lawyers in Germany, France, Switzerland, and Italy;82 
and it has been gaining ground in international forums such as the 
Institute of International Law,33 and in the more recent international 
29. Grossfeld, Die A.nerkennung ll0. 
30. Id. at 22-29. See also the conclusions of the Procureur General at the Belgian 
Cour de cassation in two ancient cases involving recognition of a French stock company: 
Judgment of Feb. 8, 1849, [1849] Pas. Beige 1. 221; Judgment of Jan. 20, 1851, [1851] 
Pas. Beige 1. 307. Cf. Judgment of July 22, 1847, [1847] D.P. II 2, 171 (French cours 
royales). 
31. See note 15 supra. 
32. See Beitzke, A.nerkennung 13; van Hecke, Nationality of Companies Analysed, 9 
NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFr VOOR lNTERNATIONAAL RECHT 223, 227 (1961). 
33. See the rules of the Institute of International Law, approved on Sept. 10, 1965, 
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agreements, such as the 1956 Hague Convention Concerning Rec-
ognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign Companies, Associa-
tions, and Foundations.34 The Hague Convention, which has not 
yet come into force, was conceived as a treaty not limited to any 
particular region or regional market, although thus far all the sig-
natories are from Western Europe. Article 1 of the Hague Conven-
tion enunciates the incorporation principle in general terms,35 but 
article 2 significantly limits the reach of that principle: "If a com-
pany organized in one state establishes its real seat in another state 
it must be recognized in a third state only if the state of the real 
seat has accepted the incorporation theory." Thus the Hague Con-
vention embraces the incorporation principle only qualifiedly. 
If the opposition to the rule of incorporation has been receding 
somewhat, this trend may be due in some measure to the integrating 
effect of the rapidly growing international trade, to the emergence 
of the multistate corporation which no longer operates in the 
confines of a single nation-state, and generally to intensified trans-
national intercourse. But as article 2 of the Hague Convention dem-
onstrates, the trend is taking effect only gradually. 
B. The Regional Context 
The important article 58 of the EEC Treatyl6 clearly mirrors the 
changing currents within a regional context. Although it ostensibly 
concerns only admission to business activities and not conflict-of-laws 
and recommended for adoption "to all States"; the rulCl! are reproduced in Institut de 
Droit International: The Warsaw Session, 60 .ru.r.. J. INTL. L. 517, 523 (1966) [hereinafter 
I.I.L. Draft], and discussed in Drucker, Companies in Private International Law, 17 
INTL. 8e CoMP. L.Q. 28 (1968). 
!l4. See note 17 supra. Five ratifications are required for the Convention to come 
into effect. Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and Luxembourg signed; and all 
but Spain and Luxembourg ratified. 
!l5. Article 1 provides: 
Legal personality, acquired by a company, association, or foundation under the 
law of the contracting State where the formalities of registration or publication 
have been complied with and where its charter seat is located, shall be recognized 
as of course in the other contracting States, provided that, in addition to the 
capacity to proceed in court, it imports at least capacity to hold property and to 
enter into contracts and other legal acts. 
Legal personality, acquired without formality of registration or of publication, 
shall be recognized as of course, under the same condition, if the company, 
association, or foundation has been established in accordance with the law that 
governs the same. 
!l6. Article 58 provides: 
Companies constituted in accordance with the law of a Member State and having 
their registered office, central administration or principal establishment within the 
Community shall, for the purpose of applying ihe provisions of this Chapter, be 
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of member states. 
The term "companies" shall mean companies under civil or commercial law 
including co-operative companies and other legal persons under public or private 
law, with the exception of non-profit companies. 
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rules, it necessarily assumes that the admitted company will be rec-
ognized, since without recognition the admission to do business 
would be illusory. Article 58 postulates Community-wide freedoms 
of establishment and of supply of services87 for companies and 
legal persons which are organized in accordance with the law of a 
member state and have their registered office, central administra-
tion, or principal place of business within the Community. Thus, 
it does not require that the "real seat" (central administration) be 
in the state under whose law the company is organized or, for that 
matter, that it be anywhere in the Community.38 A literal interpre-
tation would suggest that merely a registered office anywhere within 
the Community territory would suffice to satisfy article 58. This 
broad interpretation, however, has not been entirely accepted be-
cause, pursuant to article 52, paragraph I, individual nationals of 
the member states may claim freedom of establishment in another 
state only if they are already "established" within the Community, 
and because companies are to enjoy the same, but not more exten-
sive, benefits as natural persons.39 Accordingly, the General Programs 
for the Removal of Restrictions on the Right of Establishment and 
on the Free Supply of Services, adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
provide that when the companies "have only their registered office 
within the Community .. . , their business activity shall show a con-
tinuous and effective link with the economy of a member state ... " 
before they can claim the benefits of the Treaty.40 
The liberal posture embodied in article 58 is obviously related 
to the coordination of national company laws which is prescribed 
by the Treaty. This coordination effort-and generally the har-
monization of national laws and economic and social policies-are 
expected to advance freedom of establishment and also remove the 
obstacles to a more liberal recognition practice. As a short-range 
objective, however, the member states agreed that the obligation 
to grant recognition should be strengthened; and they chose an in-
ternational convention as the vehicle to achieve that objective. 
37. Although article 58 expressly deals only with establishment, article 66 provides 
that article 58 shall also apply to supply of services. 
38. See Beitzke, Anerkennung 13; Dieu, supra note 17, at 539-43; Goldman, La 
reconnaissance 189-94; Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 17. 
39. EEC Treaty art. 58. 
40. 5 JOURNAL OFFICIEL DFS CoMMUNAUTES EuROPUNNFS [E.E.C. J.O.] 36 (1962). See 
also id. at 33. In order to provide a framework for a progressive implementation of the 
Treaty provisions on the freedoms of establishment and of supply of services, the 
Council of Ministers adopted the two "General Programs," which define categories of 
national discriminatory restrictions on access to the many enumerated occupations and 
professions, and fix deadlines within which these restrictions must be removed. 
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IV. CONVENTION ON THE MUTUAL RECOGNITION 
OF COMPANIES AND LEGAL PERSONS 
A. The Origin 
1337 
The task of drafting the Convention on the Mutual Recognition 
of Companies and Legal Persons41 (1968 Convention or Convention 
on Recognition of Companies) was entrusted to a working group 
composed both of staff members of the EEC Commission and of 
experts appointed by the member governments.42 With Professor 
Berthold Goldman of the Paris Law Faculty as an effective, albeit 
stern, chairman, the group labored for three years. It had at its 
disposal a report prepared by Professor Beitzke,43 and it completed 
the first draft of the Convention on June 11, 1965. The Commission 
concurred in this draft on January 5, 1966; and the final text, con-
taining certain modifications desired by the Governments, was ready 
in October 1967. The text was to be signed in December 1967, but 
this plan did not reach fruition because of the Nether lands' reac-
tion to General de Gaulle's attitude toward the admission of the 
United Kingdom to the EEC.44 The 1968 Convention was finally 
41. Convention sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des societes et personnes morales, 
signed on Feb. 29, 1968, 4 REVUE TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT EUROPEEN [REv. TRIM. DR. 
EuROP.] 400 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Convention]. The text of the 1968 Convention in 
the four official languages and in an unofficial English translation is reproduced in 
12 BULL. E.E.C. SUPP. No. 2 (1969). An unofficial English translation of the 1968 
Convention may be found in 2 CCH CoMM. MKT. REP. 'if 6083 (1968). 
Extensive literature deals with the problem of the relationship between the 1968 
Convention and the recognition of companies in the EEC. See J. RENAULD, supra note 
16, at 6.02; Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung; Capotorti, Il problema del reciproco riconosci• 
mento delle societd nella Comunitd economica europea, 11 R.lvISTA DELLE soCIETA 969 
(1966); F. CARUSO, LE SOCIETA NELLA CoMMUNITA ECONOMICA EUROPA 217 )1969); Cerexhe, 
La reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tt!s et personnes morales dans la Communautt! 
t!conomique europt!enne, 1968 REvuE DU MARCllE COMMUN 578 (1968); Dieu, supra note 
17; Drobnig, Conflict of Laws and the European Economic Community, 15 AM. J. 
CoMP. L. 204, 207-10 (1966-67); Drobnig, supra note 22; Gessler, Gegenseitige Aner• 
kennung von Gesellschaf ten und ]uristischen Personen im EWG-Bereich, 1967 DER 
BETRIEB 324; Goldman, Le projet de convention entre les t!tats membres de la Com• 
munautt! t!conomique europt!enne sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des socit!tes et 
personnes morales, 31 RABEL<; Z. 201 (1967) [hereinafter Goldman, Le projet]; Goldman, 
The Convention Between the Member States of the E.E.C. on the Mutual Recognition 
of Companies and Legal Persons, 6 C.M. L. REv. 104 (1968-69); Goldman, La recon-
naissance; van der Grinten, Erkenning van vennootschappen en rechtspersonen in de 
Europese Economische Gemeenschap, 14 SOCIAAL·ECONOMISCHE WETGEVING 201 (1966); 
Grossfeld, Die Anerkennung 16-21, 46-48; Houin, Ou en est le droit des socit!tt!s dans 
le Marcht! commun, 4 REv. TRIM. DR. EuRoP. 131, particularly 145-47 (1968); van Hecke, 
Erkenning, zetelverplaatsing en fusie, in EuROPEES VENNOOTSCHAPSRECHT, LE REGIME 
JURIDIQUE DES SOCIETES DANS LA CEE 149 (1968). 
42. See Rapport concernant la Convention sur la reconnaissance mutuelle des 
socit!tt!s et personnes morales, Rapporteur: Goldman, 4 REv. TRIM. DR. EUROP. 405, at 
para. 1 (1968) [hereinafter Rapport Goldman]. See also Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91. 
43. Beitzke, Anerkennung 1-47. 
44. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 91. 
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signed on behalf of the six Governments by the Ministers of For-
eign Affairs on February 9, 1968. 
A clause in the preamble affirms that the ministers approved the 
1968 Convention when "meeting within the forum of the Council." 
The ministers employed this somewhat controversial formula in the 
past when they had reached an agreement on a matter not specifi-
cally authorized in the Treaty, but falling generally within its 
orbit.45 In the Commission's view, the recourse to this procedure 
endowed the 1968 Convention with a status different from an ordi-
nary treaty: The agreement was, a Commission spokesman declared, 
"the first European Convention supplementing the Treaty of 
Rome."46 Although this factor may be politically significant, the 
1968 Convention is still an interstate treaty governed in principle 
by international law. It is important to note that the Convention 
did not become a "Community act" in the technical sense and thus 
presumably would not fall within the jurisdiction of the Commu-
nity Court of Justice.47 Nevertheless, in addition to the fact that 
it was drafted under the auspices of the EEC, the text of the 1968 
Convention confirms the close link between the Convention and 
the Community.48 Moreover, the fact that the 1968 Convention 
was concluded exclusively among the member states of the Commu-
nity and will come into effect only after all members have ratified 
45. See Rapport fait au nom de la Commission juridique sur les actes de la 
collectivitt! des Etats membres de la Communautt! ainsi que sur les actes du Conseil 
non prevus par les traites, Rapporteur: Burger, [1968-1969] EUR. PARL. Do~., No. 215 
(1969), and literature cited therein. 
46. Comm. Spokesman's Group (EEC), P-14/68, Information Memo (Brussels, 
undated). 
47. According to article 173 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice has the 
authority "to review the lawfulness of acts other than recommendations or opinions 
of the Council and the Commission." The most important reviewable "acts" (regulations, 
directives, decisions) are defined in article 189. 
48. See, for instance, the references to the EEC Treaty, specifically to articles 220 
and 58, in the preamble to the 1968 Convention; article 10 of the 1968 Convention 
(discussed in text accompanying notes 96-98 infra); the last clause of article 11 of the 
1968 Convention, indicating the controlling role of the EEC Treaty; articles 12, 13, 15, 
16, and 19 of the 1968 Convention assigning certain ministerial functions to the 
Secretary General of the Council of the Communities; article 18 of the 1968 Convention, 
requiring the President of the Council of the Communities to call a conference for a 
revision of the Convention if requested by a contracting party; and the 1968 Conven-
tion's articles 19 (four authentic texts), 17 (unlimited duration) and 14 (requirement 
of ratification by all six members) which were obviously inspired by the corresponding 
articles in the EEC Treaty. It was also agreed to publish the 1968 Convention for 
information purposes in the Official Journal of the Communities (E.E.C. J.O.), Rapport 
Goldman para. 45. The 1968 Convention refers throughout to "Contracting States" and 
"territories to which the present Convention applies"; but the preamble makes it clear 
that the states that concluded the 1968 Convention were "The High Contracting 
Parties to the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community." 
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it40 indicates the close relationship between the Convention and 
the Community. 
The original draft of the 1968 Convention contained an article 
similar to the corresponding provision in another "European Con-
vention," the Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and Execution 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.60 This article re-
flected the assumption that any state which in the future would 
join the Comm.unity would be required to adhere to the Conven-
tion on Recognition of Companies-perhaps with certain adjust-
ments to be negotiated at the time-as well as to the EEC Treaty 
itself. This provision was dropped in the final text, and all that 
remains is a joint declaration which is included in a Protocol an-
nexed to the Convention and in which the parties declare their 
readiness to negotiate with any state "associated" (and by inference 
with any state that will become associated) with the Community, 
with a view toward mutual recognition of companies along the 
lines of the basic principles of the 1968 Convention and in the 
context of the agreement of association.111 However, in the minutes 
of their meeting, the Ministers recorded their unanimous opinion 
that any state which joins the Comm.unity must also adhere to the 
1968 Convention. This statement is of immediate interest in view 
of the impending negotiations with the United Kingdom, Denmark, 
Ireland, and Norway concerning admission to membership in the 
Community. 
B. The Benefiting Companies and Legal Persons 
According to article 1 of the 1968 Convention, all companies 
formed under civil and commercial law, including cooperatives, 
49. Art. 14. The 1968 Convention was approved by the French Parliament, Law of 
Dec. 20, 1969, [1969] J.O. 12436. 
50. Art. 63. That Convention was signed on Sept. 27, 1968. The French text was 
published by Conseil des Communautes europeennes, undated. The English unofficial 
translation is in 12 BULL. E.E.C. SUPP. No. 2 (1969); and authentic texts are given in 
the respective French, German, Dutch, and Italian versions of the same supplement. 
See Hay, The Common Market Preliminary Draft Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments-Some Considerations of Policy and Interpretation, 16 AM. 
J. CoMP. L. 149 (1968); Nadelmann, The Common Market Judgments Convention and 
a Hague Conference Recommendation: What Steps Next?, 82 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1282 (1969); 
Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: 
The Common Market Draft, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 995 (1967); Nadelmann, The Outer 
World and the Common Market Experts' Draft Convention on Recognition of Judg-
me:nts, 5 C.M. L. R.Ev. 409 (1968). 
51. EEC Treaty article 238 provides that: "The Community may conclude with a 
third country, a union of States or an international organisation agreements creating 
an association embodying reciprocal rights and obligations, joint actions and special 
procedures." A number of such agreements have been concluded, but the content varies 
considerably. 
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must be recognized, without more, if they were organized under 
the law of a state party to the Convention, 52 and if they have their 
registered seat (siege statutaire, satzungsmiissiger Sitz) in a territory 
to which the Convention applies. Article 8 makes it clear that any 
such company may not be denied recognition even if it is not con-
sidered a full-fl.edged legal person under the law in the state in 
which it was formed; the company must be recognized so long as, 
under that law, it has the capacity to sue or be sued in its own name, 
as in the case of the German partnership (offene Handelsgesell-
schaft). In addition, article 2 extends the benefit of recognition to 
all legal persons organized under public or private law, other than 
companies, so long as they meet the same conditions as companies 
must and so long as they are engaged in an "economic activity" 
normally performed for remuneration. 
A comparison of this definition of the benefiting companies and 
legal persons with that contained in article 58 of the EEC Treaty 
reveals some interesting differences. 53 First, while article 58 appears 
to exclude "non-profit companies,"54 the 1968 Convention benefits 
companies of civil and commercial law, whatever the purpose or 
nature of their activities; their legal form, not their purpose, is the 
determining factor. Thus companies of civil law are included under 
the 1968 Convention, even though under the laws of some member 
states they may be organized for a nonprofit purpose.55 On the 
other hand, companies of commercial law are conclusively pre-
sumed to engage in "commercial" activity and thus, under the 1968 
Convention definition, to pursue a gainful purpose, even though 
in fact they may not be so doing in an isolated case. 56 
52. The term "state" will hereinafter primarily be used to indicate a state party to 
the Convention. 
53. See, Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung; Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 582; Dieu, supra 
note 17, at 537; Rapport Goldman para. 9-14; Goldman, Le projet 214; van der Grinten, 
supra note 41, at 204-08. . 
54. Cerexhe suggests that article 58, "despite its rather paradoxical language," in 
effect does not purport to require gainful purpose for companies of civil or commercial 
law. Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 584. 
55. Under § 705 of the German Civil Code, BGB § 705 (Kolhammer 1957), a 
company formed pursuant to the Civil Code may pursue any purpose, including a 
nonprofit purpose. Such a company, however, is excluded from the coverage of the 
1968 Convention, because it cannot sue or be sued in its own name. See §§ 50, 736 of 
the Zivilprozessordnung, ZPO §§ 50, 736 (C.H. Beck 1967). See also Beitzke, Zur 
Anerkennung 93. On the other hand, the societd semplice of the Italian law and the 
vennootschap onder firma of the Netherlands law are included within the coverage of 
the 1968 Convention. See Declaration commune No. 1, attached to the 1968 Convention. 
56. Such a company might be a charitable institution run by a stock company, as 
provided for in § 6 of the German Commercial Code, HGB § 6 (C. H. Beck 1968). 
With respect to the German partnership (offene Handelsgesellschaft) under commercial 
law, see HGB § 105 (C. H. Beck 1968), which requires a "commercial" and therefore 
gainful purpose (Handelsgewerbe). 
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A second extension of the 1968 Convention's coverage beyond 
the scope of article 58 of the EEC Treaty, stems from article 2 of 
the Convention which extends coverage to all legal persons other 
than companies, provided they meet the prerequisite of economic 
activity normally performed for remuneration.57 This new verbal 
formulation58 was substituted for the "gainful purpose" prerequi-
site of article 58 because that article, if construed narrowly, might 
not include certain enterprises which, the national experts felt, 
should be covered by the Convention. The experts particularly had 
in mind nationalized enterprises; mixed private-public companies 
providing public services; and certain modem organizational forms 
of economic activity which are of entirely private nature, such as 
companies established by industrial enterprises to supply those en-
terprises with services relating to research, market surveys, or the 
protection of industrial property rights-fields in which a profit 
motive may not be directly involved. Yet the experts were fully 
aware of the vagueness of the new concept when they drafted the 
provision. 59 
C. Prerequisites for Recognition: Optional Limitations 
For recognition purposes, it is sufficient for the companies and 
legal persons covered by articles I and 2 to have their registered 
seat anywhere within the Community, even if they have their real 
seat outside the Community. For instance, a company organized 
under Dutch law with a real seat in the United States would be 
covered by the recognition provisions of the 1968 Convention. Thus 
a registered seat-not a real seat-is the minimum contact required 
for a claim for recognition. This requirement is, as has been shown, 
in accord with the literal reading of article 58 relating to the free-
doms of establishment and of supply of services.60 The "real seat" 
is defined in article 5 of the 1968 Convention as the place of the 
"central administration." This definition coincides with that of the 
Hague Convention and with that of the national law in the member 
states.61 If this were the entire story, the victory of the incorpora-
57. More specifically, such legal persons are included under article 2 if their principal 
or accessory purpose is "economic activity normaly performed for remuneration," or 
if they actually engage in such activity on a continuing basis without thereby infringing 
the law under which they were formed. 
58. But see EEC Treaty article 60 which speaks of "services normally supplied for 
remuneration." 
59. Rapport Goldman paras. 10-12. 
60. See note 37 supra and text accompanying notes 37-38 supra. 
61. Rapport Goldman para. 18. I.I.L. Draft (discussed supra note 33) defines "the 
actual seat of a rompany" as "the place at which it has its principal center of control 
and management even if the decisions which are taken at that place follow directives 
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tion principle would be complete with regard to recognition. How-
ever, following the pattern of the Hague Convention,62 the concession 
made in the first two articles by the "real seat" advocates is in part 
taken back in articles 3 and 4. 
First, in article 3, each state is left free to declare that it will 
deny recognition to any company whose real seat is outside the 
territories to which the 1968 Convention applies, if the company 
does not maintain a genuine link (lien serieux, wirkliche Verbin-
dung) with the economy of one such territory. This rather vague 
limiting clause differs somewhat from the corresponding, and equally 
vague, limitation grafted upon article 58 of the EEC Treaty by 
the above-mentioned General Programs,68 and it may cause difficul-
ties of interpretation. It is clearly designed to prevent a non-Commu-
nity enterprise from claiming recognition within the Community 
on the basis of nothing more than a "post office box" address (a 
registered seat) in the Netherlands. 
Second, article 4 deals with the status of a company which claims 
recognition in the signatory state where its real seat is located, but 
which was organized under the law of another signatory state, in 
which it has its registered seat. In such a situation, under the pre-
vailing national laws, if the real seat were located in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, recognition of such a company in that coun-
try could be denied, whereas if the real seat were in Belgium, Italy, 
Luxembourg, or (since the 1966 reform) France, the law of the 
real seat would be applied without denial of recognition.64 The 1968 
Convention formula for dealing with this situation was worked out 
in a special meeting of the Ministers of Justice of Belgium, the 
given by shareholders who reside elsewhere." Drucker, supra note 33, at 34. With 
respect to the concept of "central administration," see E. RABEL, supra note 14, at 40-41. 
62. See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
63. The General Programs require "a continuous and effective link with the 
economy of a Member State." See note 40 supra. The Goldman report acknowledges, 
but does not explain the divergence. See Rapport Goldman para. 18. The International 
Court of Justice has held that a state cannot lay down rules governing the grant of 
its nationality and claim that these rules 
are entitled to recognition by another State unless it has acted in conformity with 
the general aim of making the legal bond of nationality accord with the individual's 
genuine connection with the State which assumes the defense of its citizens by 
means of protection as against other States. 
Lichtenstein v. Guatemala (Nottebohm case), [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, 24 (emphasis added). 
See also the concept of "real connection,'' discussed in note 66 infra. 
64. See Rapport Goldman paras. 3-4; CODE COMM. art. 197 (Pasinomie 1935) (Bel-
gium); C. CIV. art. 2505 (Hoepli 1964) (Italy); article 159 of Luxembourg's Law of 
Aug. 15, 1915, concerning Commercial Companies; article 3 of the French Law of 
July 24, 1966, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966] B.L.D. 353. See note 16 supra. 
Theoretically, a refusal of recognition in this case could be justified on the ground 
that such a company is entitled to equal, but not more favorable, treatment as com• 
pared with local companies. See text accompanying note 74 infra. 
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Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The ministers considered the prob-
lem in the context of a company which had been incorporated in 
good faith in the Netherlands, and which, after it had operated 
for a time in and from the Netherlands, decided for good business 
reasons to transfer its central administration (real seat) to another 
signatory state. According to the final solution embodied in article 
4 of the 1968 Convention, a state may declare that it will apply the 
mandatory provisions of its own law to a foreign company whose 
real seat is in its territory. However, it may apply its nonmandatory 
(optional) provisions to that company only if the company's charter 
does not contain a reference to the law of the state under which it 
was formed or if the company is unable to show that it has in fact 
conducted its activity during a "reasonable time" in the state of 
its formation. 
One problem with the formula is that it may be difficult to de-
termine in some instances whether a provision is mandatory or 
optional in a given system. The mandatory provisions of company 
law generally include rules on the formation of companies. Thus, 
the argument could be made that if, according to the mandatory 
rules of the state in which the foreign company has its real seat, the 
company is not validly constituted, it may be denied recognition. 
The Dutch experts strongly opposed such an interpretation as de-
feating the objective of recognition, and they received substantial 
support from some other delegations. Without taking a position on 
this argument, the German delegation posed a series of searching 
questions and demanded that a uniform interpretation be agreed 
upon. Evidently the German experts were troubled by a political 
nightmare: A foreign company, possibly organized abroad by Ger-
mans with German capital, could maintain its central administration 
in German federal territory and claim recognition there as a foreign 
company, even though the workers would not be represented on 
the company's supervisory board as required by the federal law on 
workers' "codetermination."65 The German demand, however, was 
opposed by some who argued that the experts should not be ex-
pected to interpret their own texts and by others who considered 
the problem of limited practical importance. Apparently, the ex-
perts have not reached an understanding on an interpretation. 
Thus, any problems that may arise under article 4 will have to be 
resolve on a case-by-case basis, without reference to an agreed inter-
65. With respect to the "codetermination" in the Federal Republic of Germany, see 
Vagts, Reforming the "Modem" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARv. 
L. REv. 21!, l!0, 64-75 (1966), with references to the German federal legislation. 
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pretation. Nevertheless, the text of article 4 itself makes fairly clear 
the intention of the draftsmen. They intended to prohibit a refusal 
of recognition by the state of the real seat, and instead-as a com-
promise-authorized that state to impose its own law on the recog-
nized company. The practical effects of this formula are uncertain 
and could vary from state to state depending on local law. The 
formula has all the disadvantages of complexity and ambiguity that 
characterize a laborious compromise. Although the solution repre-
sents some progress over the Hague Convention, 66 the prospect of 
living under nvo different company-law systems is fraught with so 
many uncertainties, particularly if the requirements of the two sys-
tems should not be compatible, that the affected company is likely to 
feel compelled to transfer its real seat to the state in which it was 
formed, in order to avoid the operation of article 4.67 
The state's option under article 4 to impose its own law upon a 
foreign company is limited to the case in which the company's real 
seat is in its own territory; if the real seat is in a different territory, 
article 4 does not apply. More specifically, a company organized in 
state A, with its real seat in state B, must be recognized in state C 
even if state B follows the real-seat principle. This result is another 
small improvement over the Hague Conven~ion formula which 
demands recognition in this situation only if state B adheres to the 
principle of incorporation.68 The result called for by the Convention 
on Recognition of Companies is desirable in this case since the 
interest of the "third" state, where recognition is claimed, in having 
its own law applied is not as pervasive as it might be if the real seat 
were also located in its territory. But the adopted solution could still 
lead to a situation in which a company is viewed in a third state as 
governed by the law of the state of its formation, while the state of 
66. Article 2 of the Hague Convention (see note 17 supra) allows refusal of 
recognition in this situation unless the real seat is transferred to a state which follows 
the principle of incorporation. Similarly, articles 3 and 4 of the I.I.L. Draft would 
permit refusal of recognition by the state of the real seat if the company's charter does 
not accord with the law of that state, unless (and this is a deviation from the Hague 
solution) the company carries its principal business activity in the state of incorporation 
(article 3) or has "real connection" with the territory of that state (article 4). This "real 
connection must be established by facts other than the mere indication of a 
registered office, and may in particular consist of a place of business in the territory, 
of the origin of the share or loan capital of the company, of the nationality or habitual 
residence of the shareholders or of those in control of the company" (article 4). 
67. See Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 94; van der Grinten, supra note 41, at 208. In 
order to reduce the threat to legal security that is posed by the options left open in 
articles 3 and 4, the 1968 Convention provides that the states which desire to take 
advantage of those options must make the necessary declarations, at the latest, when 
they deposit their instrument of ratification (article 15). 
68. Hague Convention art. 2(2). See also articles 8 and 4 of the I.I.L. Draft. 
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the real seat is free to apply its own mandatory law to the company 
pursuant to article 4. The fact that article 4 allows for such an out-
come indicates that the 1968 Convention does not achieve the full-
ness of uniform treatment which is a major, if not the paramount, 
objective of conflict-of-laws rules.60 
D. Effects of Recognition 
Reflecting the "traditional solution of private international 
law,"70 which is also apparent in the Hague agreement, article 6 of 
the 1968 Convention provides that a company or legal person which 
is entitled to recognition by virtue of the Convention shall have the 
same capacity that it has under the law of the state in which it was 
organized. But here again the 1968 Convention contains limitations 
designed to ensure the forum state a degree of freedom to apply its 
own law.71 
The first such limitation derives from article 4 which can come 
into play, as has been stated, 72 when the real seat of the company is 
situated in the state in which recognition is sought while the situs of 
incorporation is in another member state. Among the rules of its 
own law which the state of the real seat is free to apply to the foreign 
company might be a provision affecting the capacity of the com-
pany.1a 
Second, pursuant to article 7, the state in which recognition is 
claimed may deny the foreign company specific rights which under 
its mm law are also denied to local companies of a "corresponding 
type." Any such limitation, however, cannot have the effect of de-
priving the foreign company of its basic capacity to be the subject of 
rights and obligations, to enter into contracts and undertake other 
legal acts, and to sue and be sued.74 Furthermore, the foreign com-
pany which receives such limited recognition cannot itself invoke in 
court the limitations allowed by article 7. Thus, the limitations are 
exclusively for the protection of local parties that contracted with 
the company.76 
69. See Grossfeld, Die A.nerkennung 47. But see Beitzke, Anerkennung 20. 
70. "Conformement a une solution traditionnelle du droit international prive •••• " 
Rapport Goldman para. 23. 
71. For analogies in American law, see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 409, 413. 
72. See text accompanying note 68 supra. 
73. Rapport Goldman para. 23. 
74. Cf. Hague Convention art. 6. Further limitations are permitted in article 6 of 
the I.I.L. Draft. 
75. This was considered by some an improper discrimination against foreign 
companies. See, e.g., van der Grinten, supra note 41, at 209. But see Rapport Goldman 
para. 25. 
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The limitations on recognition which are possible under articles 
4 and 7 are based on a rather esoteric distinction between two con-
cepts: on the one hand the "general capacity" consisting of the 
"abstract aptitude to take part in legal life"76 as "a distinct entity" 
which is determined exclusively by the law of the state of incorpora-
tion; and on the other hand, the specific rights "which form the 
concrete content of the general capacity"77 and which in the first 
instance are also determined by the law of the state of incorporation, 
but which the state where recognition is sought may deny by refer-
ence to its own law,78 within the limits described above.79 This 
abstract analysis lends support to those who consider it futile to 
attempt to draw a sharp distinction between "recognition" and the 
conflict-of-laws rules which determine the law governing the capacity 
and specific rights of the foreign company.80 
When one speculates on the future application of these limita-
tions, he must keep in mind that the 1968 Convention seeks to 
ensure certain minimum rights normally associated with and derived 
from recognition, but does not deal with the freedoms of establish-
ment and of supply of services, which involve rights connected with 
speciftc activities.81 Thus, on the one hand, a German company need 
not be established in France, or supply services there, in order to 
claim the right to sue in a French court on its contract to purchase 
goods or to hire personnel in France; its right to sue derives from 
the recognition in France of its general capacity and is specifically 
guaranteed by article 7 of the Convention.82 On the other hand, if 
under French law a local limited-liability company is excluded from 
the banking business, a German limited-liability company-of a 
"corresponding type"--could also, presumably, be excluded from 
that business in France, again, in accordance with article 7. More-
over, the German company, in seeking to enter the banking business 
in France, could not rely on the EEC Treaty provisions concerning 
establishment and supply of services, since, under those provisions, 
France is required to accord the German company only equal treat-
ment with that accorded to its own companies.83 
76, Rapport Goldman para. 24. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. See Hague Convention art. 5. 
79. See text accompanying notes 74 and 75 supra. 
80. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
81. See also Hague Convention art. 7. 
82. That right is also a necessary corollary of the rights of establishment and supplv 
of services, as applied to specific occupations and professions. See note 40 supra and 
accompanying text. 
83. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. 
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There is, finally, another group of restrictions related to article 7 
which may be illustrated by the rule in German law confining 
membership on the executive board (Vorstand) of German stock 
companies to natural persons and making legal persons ineligible 
for membership. It could hardly be argued that a foreign stock 
company formed in a state which does not have such a restriction 
could be denied recognition in the Federal Republic under article 7 
solely because its executive board includes another company-that 
is, a legal rather than a natural person-among its members. Profes-
sor Goldman takes the optimistic view that this type of question is 
not likely to arise very often in practice. In his opinion, the differ-
ences among the national laws governing the two types of companies 
that one is most likely to encounter in transnational business-that 
is, the stock company and limited-liability company-are no longer 
very marked so far as the rules concerning capacity are concerned; 
and the differences which do exist will be further reduced in re-
sponse to the coordination of national laws.84 Some may argue, how-
ever, that Professor Goldman is overly optimistic about the amount 
of progress which can be achieved through coordination. 
E. The Exception of Public Policy (Ordre Public) 
In the field of conflict of laws, the exception of public policy 
(ordre public) traditionally enables the forum state to refuse to 
apply foreign law which would otherwise govern under its own 
choice-of-law rules. Thus, for instance, the Hague Convention stip-
ulates that its provisions governing recognition may be disregarded 
by a signatory state on the ground of ordre public.85 
In the framework of the EEC, a public-policy exception formu-
lated in such general terms as that of the Hague Convention ap-
peared inappropriate. For that reason the draftsmen of the Conven-
tion on Recognition of Companies sought to restrict the scope of the 
exception; in article 9 they limited the application of that exception 
to situations in which the company claiming recognition contra-
venes-through its charter purpose, through the objective which it 
seeks to achieve, or through the activities in which it is in fact en-
gaged86-the principles which the forum state considers a matter of 
84. See Goldman, La reconnaissance 194-96. 
85. Hague Convention art. 8. 
86. This formula, enumerating the "purpose,'' "objective,'' and actual activity, is 
an expanded version of the clause in the Franco-German Convention of Establishment 
and Navigation of 1956, which served as its inspiration. It is designed to prohibit states 
from refusing recognition on the basis of rules governing the constitution and 
functioning of the company. See Rapport Goldman paras. 28, 29-30. 
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public policy "in the private international-law sense."87 The drafts-
men, however, did not attempt to provide a uniform definition of 
the concept of public policy "in the private international-law 
sense."88 This approach somewhat resembles the approach taken in 
the United States, where the exception of public policy remains 
operative among the states of the Union. Although in principle the 
scope of the exception in this country is defined by state law, its 
reach has been reduced by the courts in the choice-of-law setting, 
and its application in that setting is subject only to a very loose 
control of the United States Constitution.89 In a somewhat different 
setting, however, American courts, relying on the full faith and 
credit clause of the Constitution, have for all practical purposes 
eliminated public policy as a ground for the refusal to "recognize" 
the judgments of sister states.90 
It was suggested during the negotiations on article 9 of the 1968 
Convention that the concept of public policy should be made a part 
of Community law, common to all states and applicable not only to 
recognition of legal persons, but also in other contexts, such as that 
involving the Convention on Judicial Jurisdiction and Execution of 
Judgments.91 The Governments, however, evidently were unwilling 
to go that far in the direction of unification. On its face, article 9 
seems to assume that, subject to the above-mentioned vague limita-
tion,92 it is for each state to supply its own definition of "public 
policy" in applying the exception. Nevertheless, in view of the con-
sistent case law of the national courts of the signatory states, public 
policy "in the private international-law sense" was clearly intended 
to encompass only the fundamental political, social, and economic 
precepts of the forum state; in any case it was understood to be less 
comprehensive than the French "internal public policy" ( ordre 
public interne ).93 Thus, although the uncertainty of the protean 
87. See Article 9 of the 1968 Convention. 
88. See generally Beitzke, Zur Anerkennung 96; Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 588-90; 
Dieu, supra note 17, at 545; Rapport Goldman paras. 27-32; van der Grinten, supra note 
41, at 209. 
89. For a discussion of constitutional impact in the choice-of-law setting, see A. 
EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 28-33. 
90. See Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED 
ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 196, 272-73, 625-26 (1963); A. EHRENZWEIG, supra 
note 16, at 138-39; Reese &: Kaufmann, supra note 25, at 1137, 1143. 
91. See note 50 supra. 
92. See text accompanying note 88 supra. 
93. Article 30 of the Introductory Law to the German Civil Code, EGBGB art. 30 
(Palandt 1969), which deals with the German equivalent of what the Convention 
describes as the "ordre public in the private international law sense,'' provides that 
"the application of a foreign law is excluded if the application would be contrary to 
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concept of public policy has been reduced somewhat in the 1968 
Convention, it probably still encompasses not only certain funda-
mental rules of statutory national law, but also the underlying prin-
ciples and policies as well. 
Article 9 singles out one specific instance in which the exception 
of public policy may not be invoked. It provides that if the so-called 
"one-man company" may lawfully exist in its own state, it cannot 
be denied recognition in the other states on the ground of public 
policy.u Although national company laws in the Community at 
present do not allow a company to be initially organized by a single 
founder, both German and Dutch laws do acknowledge the continu-
ing existence of a company even if, after its formation, all of its 
shares are acquired by the same person; and French law follows this 
view with regard to foreign companies when the law governing those 
companies acknowledges such continuing existence. The Belgian 
courts, however, have steadfastly refused, on grounds of public 
policy, to recognize such "one-man" companies.95 From the view-
point of the Belgian Government, this provision of article 9 offers 
a convenient opportunity for replacing an outdated and obnoxious 
judge-made rule.96 Article 9 does not provide an express answer to 
the question whether the forum state could impose personal liability 
on the single shareholder, but perhaps a subsequent directive on the 
coordination of the company laws might tackle this thorny problem. 
good morals or to the purpose of a German law." Despite this broad language, the 
courts construe the exception narrowly, permitting refusal only if the application of 
foreign law should "attack directly the foundations of the German political or economic 
life" or if it should be "outright unbearable for the German legal order in terms of its 
legal concepts and in its measure of good morals." G_ KEGEL, supra note 26, at 184-87 
(citing cases as 184-85). Similarly, article 31 of the Italian Codice Civile, C. Crv. art. 31 
(Hoepli 1964), provides in broad language that in no case may foreign laws, regulations, 
entities, or contracts have effect in Italy "if they are contrary to the public order or 
good morals (costume)." Yet the courts have limited the exception to ensuring "respect 
of the highest and most essential interests" of the Italian legal order. Parazza v. Garde, 6 
Giust. Civ. I 242 (1955), (Corte di Cassazione), and other cases cited in V. MARTINO, 
CODICE CIVILE, CoMMENTO CON LA GIURISPRUDENZA 33 (4th ed. 1964). In France, a 
distinction is made between "ordre public interne" (or more accurately, "ordre public 
au sens du droit civil interne") which is illustrated by article 6 of the Code civile, 
C. Crv. art. 6 (172d ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1965), providing that parties cannot 
derogate by contract mandatory rules of the law-and "ordre public international" (or 
more precisely, "ordre public au sens du droit international prive"). See H. BATIFFOL, 
supra note 16, at No. 367. In France, still another notion of "ordre international public" 
concerns "les grands problemcs internationaux." 
94. See also Rapport Goldman paras. 28-29. 
95. See I J. VAN RYN, PRINCIPES DE DROIT COMMERCIAL §§ 492-93 (1954). 
96. In fact, the Belgian Government is presently considering reforming its company 
law relating to one-man companies, The reform law would allow a stock company to 
act as a sole founder in forming a subsidiary. This proposal goes beyond any national 
law in the Community in allowing formation of a one-man company. 
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Article 10, which also relates to the public-policy exception, 
makes it clear that any "principles and rules" of national law that 
are contrary to the EEC Treaty may not be considered national 
public policy for the purpose of denying recognition under article 9. 
The experts apparently had in mind certain principles-such as 
discrimination on the ground of nationality in the field of establish-
ment-which, although eliminated among the members of the Com-
munity, may remain applicable in the member states vis-a-vis 
nationals of countries outside the Community.97 Yet article 10 would 
probably also apply to the non-self-executing provisions of the EEC 
Treaty or to Community directives, if a member failed to imple-
ment those provisions in its national law, although the experts 
obviously did not wish to contemplate the likelihood of such non-
compliance. One interesting practical effect of article 10 may be that, 
in case of litigation before a national court concerning recognition, 
that court may be required, in accordance with article 177 of the 
EEC Treaty,98 to refer to the Community Court of Justice the ques-
tion of interpretation of that provision of the EEC Treaty which 
the relevant national policy is alleged to contravene.99 
F. Toward a Uniform Interpretation? 
The Community Court of Justice would seem to be the logical 
forum for ensuring an effective application and, above all, a uniform 
interpretation of the 1968 Convention, since national courts are 
likely to diverge in their interpretation of some of the Convention's 
general and often ambiguous formulas. But, as indicated above, the 
jurisdiction of the Community Court does not extend to the 1968 
Convention,100 although it could be so extended if a clause to that 
effect were included in the text of the Convention. One possible 
legal basis for a clause so extending the Court's jurisdiction might 
be found in article 182 of the EEC Treaty, which enables the Court 
to assume jurisdiction over Treaty-connected disputes between two 
member states if those disputes are submitted to the Court by virtue 
of a special agreement (compromis, Schiedsvertrag). If article 182 
were used as the basis for jurisdiction, however, such jurisdiction 
could extend only to disputes between member states and could not 
97. See Rapport Goldman para. 21. 
98. EEC Treaty art. 177: "The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a 
preliminary decision concerning: (a) the interpretation of this Treaty. • • ." 
99. See Cerexhe, supra note 41, at 590, 
100. See note 47 supra and accompanying text. 
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extend to controversies between private parties. Considering the 
nature of the 1968 Convention, this limitation would gravely impair 
the utility of the Court's role. Moreover, the majority of the experts 
reportedly interpreted article 182 to require a special agreement for 
each separate dispute. Such a narrow interpretation seems to pre-
clude using article 182 as a basis for jurisdiction. 
A more promising basis for a clause in the 1968 Convention 
giving the Community Court of Justice jurisdiction over Conven-
tion disputes is offered by article 177 of the EEC Treaty.101 Accord-
ing to that provision, a national court, hearing a case between 
private parties, may-and if it is a court of last instance, must-
certify to the Community Court any question of "interpretation ... 
of acts of the institutions of the Community," if a ruling on this 
question is necessary to reach a decision in the case. By inserting an 
appropriate clause in the Convention, it would be possible to extend 
the authority of the Court under article 177 to cases before national 
r.ourts involving questions of interpretation of the Convention. No 
amendment of the EEC Treaty would seem necessary to achieve this 
purpose. At the time the 1968 Convention was drafted, however, the 
member states were apparently not prepared to take this further step 
toward legal integration. It was argued that the Court of Justice 
was essentially equipped to deal only with questions of "public 
law," and that it would have to form a separate chamber to 
deal with "private-law" cases of the sort that arise under the Con-
vention. A more weighty argument was based on the proposition 
that the question of the extension of the Court's role was of a more 
general scope, because it arose in connection with all the "Euro-
pean" conventions negotiated in accordance with article 220. Ac-
cording to that argument, since different arrangements might be re-
quired for different conventions, an amendment to the EEC Treaty 
might be more appropriate for dealing with the problem. Thus, the 
working group confined itself to the promulgation of a joint declara-
tion which was attached to the 1968 Convention102 in which the 
parties affirmed their readiness to study the possibility of broadening 
the jurisdiction of the Court and negotiating an agreement to that 
effect. A special group has in fact been established for this pur-
pose,103 and it has reportedly reached an agreement on a draft Pro-
101. See note 97 supra. 
102. Declaration commune No. 3, attached to 1968 Convention. 
103, CoMMlSSION, SECOND GENERAL R.El'oRT ON THE ACI'IVlTIES OF THE COMMUNI'I1ES 
1968, 88 (1969). 
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tocol that would extend the Court's jurisdiction so as to enable it to 
interpret the 1968 Convention in cases certified to it from national 
courts in accordance with article 177. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the context of a regional integrated market, law on the recog-
nition of companies should serve to advance the security and growth 
of transnational intercourse and to free the corporate decision-maker 
from unnecessary legal restraints. Perhaps because the negotiations 
for the EEC Convention on Recognition of Companies began at a 
relatively early date, when the Common Market was still more a 
hope than a reality, the Convention in some respects falls short of 
meeting this purpose. It does advance toward a stricter obligation to 
recognize and toward a greater uniformity in the choice-of-law rules 
accompanying recognition; but because of the many options left 
open to the member states, the 1968 Convention fails to ensure true 
uniform treatment and legal certainty in the practice of recognition. 
The complexity of the solutions embodied in the 1968 Convention 
was due largely to the divergence among the national laws, partic-
ularly to the divergence between Dutch law, which follows the in-
corporation principle, and the laws of the other five states, which 
still largely adhere to the real-seat principle. Moreover, the differ-
ences in the application of the "real seat" rule between the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the other four members also posed a 
problem.104 
One may only speculate what sort of document the experts could 
have produced if they had directed their considerable talents and 
expertise toward devising a truly new framework £or recognition, 
based on a realistic analysis of the common governmental and 
private interests in a modern economic union, rather than devoting 
so much attention to devising ingenious escape mechanisms designed 
to pacify traditional national fears and concerns. Actually, in its 
basic approach and technique, the 1968 Convention differs little 
from the Hague Convention, which of course was not conceived in 
the context of an integrated regional market. Yet the EEC Conven-
tion has without question introduced improvements both over the 
prevailing state of the national laws and over the Hague Conven-
tion. It has broadened the circle of the benefiting legal persons, it 
has increased the acceptance of the incorporation principle in situa-
tions in which the registered and real seats of the company are sepa-
104. See note 16 supra. 
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rated, and it has somewhat reduced the scope of the public-policy 
exception. One may expect that the convention on safeguarding the 
legal personality of a company in case of the transfer of its seat, a 
convention which still remains to be negotiated in accordance with 
article 220 of the EEC Treaty,105 will carry the trend toward har-
monization further, particlarly since mutual knowledge of national 
laws will be increased and the differences among them will be 
reduced both by national reforms and, it is also hoped, by Com-
munity coordination. 
In any event, one's judgment of the EEC Convention on Recog-
nition of Companies must be tempered by an understanding of the 
political realities in Europe at the time the Convention was drafted, 
including the fact that it was the first agreement reached in accord-
ance with article 220 to supplement the EEC Treaty, and thus was 
blessed with all the exaggerated care that lawyers everywhere tend to 
lavish upon a "precedent." To an American la'wyer, hardened by the 
disconcerting process of interest analysis which characterizes the 
current uncertain state of the conflict-of-laws doctrine in the United 
States, the formulas of the Convention appear at the same time too 
rigid to meet the vagaries of actual life and too vague to be of real 
help. One must keep in mind, of course, that the Congress of the 
United States has never even entered the precincts of the choice-of-
law area-although it has had ample and unquestioned constitu-
tional power to do so, under the full faith and credit clause and the 
interstate and foreign commerce clause-but rather has abandoned 
that area, for better or for worse, to the courts. In fact, the full faith 
and credit clause itself, as interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court, has proved to be a weak reed in the choice-of-law field.106 
Nevertheless, numerous company-related problems in the choice-of-
law field have been indirectly eliminated in the United States by the 
enactment of federal legislation in other areas, particularly in the 
securities area.107 
In the final analysis, the EEC Convention on the Mutual Recog-
nition of Companies and Legal Persons must be viewed in the 
broader perspective of the on-going effort to fashion a modern legal 
framework for transnational "European" business. This effort pro-
ceeds at three levels: the coordination . of conflicting national 
policies, including economic, monetary, regional, and subsidies 
105. EEC Treaty art. 220. 
106. See A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 28-33. 
107. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964), and Securities Exchange 
Act of 19!14, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-hh (1964). 
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policies; second, the harmonization of national laws, including com-
pany, tax, and industrial-property laws, and the creation of new 
transnational legal forms, such as the proposed "European" patent 
or "European" company form; and third, the unification of national 
conflicts-of-laws rules affecting the "mobility" of national companies. 
The Convention on Recognition of Companies falls within the third 
category, as do the proposed conventions on transnational mergers,108 
transfer of company seats,109 and bankruptcy law.110 It demonstrates 
the difficulties incumbent in fashioning uniform conflict-of-laws 
rules among nations with divergent national laws, even when those 
nations are making a conscious effort to minimize the differences in 
their laws in the framework of an integrated regional community. 
108. EEC Treaty art. 220; the proposed Convention is contained in Comite des 
experts de !'Article 220 alinea 3 du traite C.E.E., Avant projet de Convention en matierc 
de fusions internationales, 5873 /XlV /69F (mimeographed draft). 
109. EEC Treaty art. 220. 
110. The proposed Convention is contained in Kommission der Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften, Vorentwurf eines 'Obereinkommens uber den Konkurs, den Vergleich 
und Konkursahnliche Verfahren, 5267/XlV/68-D (mimeographed draft). 
